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ABSTRACT 
The problem of handling vagueness and uncertainty as two different kinds of partial 
ignorance has become a major issue in several fields of scientific research. Currently the 
most popular approaches are Bayes theory, Shafer's evidence theory, the transferable 
belief model, and the possibility theory with its relationships to fuzzy sets. 
Since the justification of some of the mentioned theories has not been clarified for a 
long time, some criticism on these models is still pending. For that reason we have 
developed a model of vagueness and uncertainty--called the context model--that 
provides a formal environment for the comparison and semantic foundation of the 
referenced theories. 
In this paper we restrict ourselves to the presentation of basic ideas keyed to the 
interpretation of Bayes theory and the Dempster-Shafer theory within the context 
model Furthermore the context model is applied to show a direct comparison of these 
two approaches based on the well-known spoiled sandwich effect, the three prisoners 
problem, and the unreliable alarm paradigm. 
KEYWORDS:  Context model, Bayes theory, Dempster-Shafer theory, trans- 
ferable belief model, decision-making, spoiled sandwich effect, three pris- 
oners problem, unreliable alarm paradigm 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The context model  aims to provide integrating structures and concepts 
for wel l - founded handl ing of  imperfect  data, where a measure - theoret i ca l  
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environment from the available symbolic and quantitative approaches to 
partial ignorance [1] is chosen to be appropriate. 
First of all, we must clarify how to interpret he notion of data within 
our approach, and which kinds of imperfectness we intend to consider. On 
a level of abstraction sufficient for a large number of applications in 
the field of knowledge-based systems we expect data to characterize the 
state of an object (obj) with respect o underlying relevant frame con- 
ditions (cond). Regarding the exhaustive formal specification of these 
frame conditions we assume that it is possible to characterize obj by an 
element state(obj, cond) of a well-defined set Dom(obj) of distinguishable 
object states. Dom(obj) denotes the domain of the object ype attached to 
obj, and is usually called the unh;erse of discourse or frame of discernment 
of obj with respect o cond. Then, considering imperfect knowledge, we 
are interested in the problem that the original characterization f state 
(obj, cond) is not available due to a lack of information about obj and 
cond. As an example suppose that cond merely permits use of statements 
like "state(obj, cond) ~ Char(obj, cond)", where Char( obj, cond) is a sub- 
set of Dom(obj) and therefore called an imprecise characterization f obj 
w.r.t, cond. If, for instance, a fully reliable digital thermometer shows 
an outside temperature of 25°C, then we may define Dom(obj)o__f [_ 80, 
70] as the domain of realistic outside temperatures and just state that the 
actual outside temperature obj, considering the frame conditions cond 
(location of thermometer, date, and time of measurement), is given by 
state(obj, cond)~ [24.5, 25.5], i.e., the corresponding characterization is 
formalized by Char(obj, cond) D=f [24.5, 25.5]. 
For any domain D we call each subset A ___ D a characteristic of D, in 
the special case IAI = 1 an elementary orprecise characteristic of D. As we 
postulate the validity of the closed world assumption state(obj, cond) E 
Dom(obj), the application of the empty characteristic Char( obj, cond) = 
is acceptable, but has to be viewed as a contradiction w.r.t cond. 
Note that Char(obj, cond) c D does not contain any information about 
preferences between the elements of Char(obj, cond); especially it does 
not express that they have the same chance to be the unknown original 
value of state(obj, cond). Hence the restriction to imprecision as one kind 
of imperfect knowledge is not satisfactory for real life applications. When- 
ever the adequate representation f our imperfect knowledge on state 
(obj, cond) requires more than a characterization Char(obj, cond) c_ Dom 
(obj), namely the incorporation of preferences between the elements of 
Char(obj, cond), we interpret these preferences as a hint for the existence 
of consideration contexts that refine the underlying frame conditions cond. 
The corresponding contexts are induced by the presupposition of addi- 
tional conditions that lead to competing, perhaps (partial) contradicting 
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characterizations of state(obj, cond). Obviously we then deal with a second 
kind of imperfect knowledge that is different o imprecision. We want to 
call it conflict or competition. The combined occurrence of imprecision and 
conflict in data reflects vagueness, and the description of state(obj, cond), 
based on vague knowledge, a vague characteristic of obj w.r.t, cond. We use 
vagueness in a narrow sense. Note that notions regarding this topic are not 
consistent in literature. For a discussion see, for example, [7]. 
On the formal level a vague characteristic is specified by a function 
y: C --, 2 o, where C denotes a set of consideration contexts and D the 
underlying domain. The values y(c), c ~ C, should be viewed as context- 
dependent (imprecise) characterizations of state(obj, cond). 
A simple example for the application of vague characteristics occurs 
when throwing a marked die. Define DD=fDom(obj) °=f {1,2 . . . . .  6} to 
be the appropriate universe of discourse for the characterization of the 
outcome obj of this experiment that is expected to be random. We suppose 
that there is the positive (subjective) probability p of obtaining an even 
number when playing the die, and the (subjective) probability 1 -p  of 
obtaining an odd number, respectively. 
From the context model's point of view we have to distinguish between 
exactly two contexts, which are c I (even number) and c 2 (odd number). 
Hence, we define the vague characteristic 7: C ~ 2 D, where C ~f {c L, c2}, 
7(cl) D-f {2,4,6} and 7(c2) D=T {1,3,5}. 
Related to the given imperfect knowledge on the die, there is neither 
the chance of refining Cl, C2 nor the chance of specializing y(c 1) and 
"Y(C2) , because no preference between the elements of 7(c 1) and y(c2), 
respectively, are available. On the other hand, to include all the infor- 
mation on our die, we have to consider uncertainty as a third kind of 
imperfect knowledge. 
Uncertainty refers to an existing preference relation of the contexts that 
supports a decison-maker in coming to a well-founded ecision on the 
unknown value state(obj, cond), representing the (non-predictable) result 
of our experiment. The relative weighting of the contexts might base on 
objective measurements or on subjective valuations. Since we do not 
investigate qualitative, but solely quantitative approaches, the mathemati- 
cal theory of measurement provides the appropriate formal environment 
for the representation of uncertainty aspects. Thus, a vague characteristic 
y: C ~ 2 ° is called valuated, if it is related to a context measure space 
(C, ~,  Pc), where Pc({C})~ ~+ quantifies the measure (relevance) of 
context c ~ C. For practical reasons we restrict ourselves to the treatment 
of finite measure spaces, i.e., we assume to have ICI ~ ~ and ~ °f2c. 
With respect o our example we define Pc({Cl}) D=fp and Pc({C2}) o___f 1 - p. 
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Note that from the mathematical point of view, in case of Pc(C)= 
1, the mapping 3' is a random set, but obviously we use a different 
interpretation asfor example used in [20]. 
In the following sections we will show in which way the concept of 
valuated vague characteristics turns out to be useful for the development 
of an integrating model of vague and uncertain data. On the one hand the 
resulting context model may be viewed as an autonomous approach to the 
handling of imperfect knowledge, but on the other hand it delivers a 
framework for a clarified formal and semantic omparison of concepts 
given in Bayes theory [2-7], Dempster-Shafer theory [7-11], the transfer- 
able belief model [12], possibility theory [13-15], and fuzzy-set heory 
[16-19]. 
Due to the many sides of imperfect knowledge it is of course impossible 
for the context model to remove the user's task of selecting and specifying 
the decisive frame conditions cond, the corresponding universe of dis- 
course Dom(obj), and to define a reasonable context measure space with 
appropriate vague characteristics. (The same work has, for example, to be 
done in pure probabilistic approaches by the choice of the underlying 
probability space.) Nevertheless the context model serves to get a unified 
theory of imperfect data, assists in a strong representation and inter- 
pretation of vague and uncertain data by valuated vague characteris- 
tics, supports the realization of important operations on valuated vague 
characteristics (e.g., specialization, generalization, refinement, coarsening, 
combination, accumulation, conditioning, data revision), and helps in 
decision-making based on a corresponding inference mechanism. 
2. VALUATED VAGUE CHARACTERISTICS 
Since the conceptual motivation of the context model has been pre- 
sented in the previous ection, we are now in the position to introduce the 
formal definition of valuated vague characteristics. 
DEFINmON 1 Let D be a non-empty universe of discourse (frame of 
discernment, domain of a data type) and C a nonempty finite set of 
contexts. 
Fc(D ) 0__f{3"13": C ~ F(D)} is defined to be the set of all vague character- 
istics of D w.r.t.C. 
Ignoring the contexts, F(D) °=f 2 ° = {AIA c_ D} designates the set of all 
(imprecise) characteristics of D. 
Let 3", 3" ~ Fc(D), A ~ F(D), and c ~ C. 
(a) 3, empty, iff 3"(C) = {3'(c)fc ~ C} = {0}; 
(b) 3' elementary, iff (Vc ~ C)(13"(c)1 = 1); 
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(c) 7 context-precise, iff (Vc ~ CXly(c)I < 1); 
(d) 7 contradictory, iff (3c ~ C)(7(c) = ~3); 
(e) V consistent, iff fTc ~ c 7(c) ~ Q; 
(f) 7 c-correct w.r.t. A, iff A c_ y(c); 
(g) y correct w.r.t. A, iff (Vc ~ C)(A c_ y(c)); 
(h) 7 specialization of 7' (7'  generalization of y, 7 more specific than 
V', V' correct w.r.t. 7), iff (Vc ~ C)(7(c) c_ 7'(c)); 
(i) eXtc[A] ~ Fc(D) , given by (Vc ~ C)(extc[A](c) = A), is called the 
extension of A w.r.t. C; 
(j) 7(c) is the c-selection (c-projection) of 7. 
Furthermore we introduce the following abbreviations: 
F°(D) Dr{7 ~ Fc(D)I7 not empty}; 
F~(D) Df{7 ~ Fc(D)I 7 not contradictory}; 
Fc2(D) Dr{7 ~ Fc(D)I 7 consistent and not contradictory}; 
C~{c ~ CIT(c) 4~ Q} (set of non-contradictory contexts w.r.t. 7). 
Remark 2 
(a) F2(D) __ rc'(D) _ r°(D) _ rc(D). 
(b) Every property that we have defined for vague characteristics w.r.t. 
D is also referable to the characteristics A ~ F(D) if their exten- 
sions eXtc[A] fulfill this property w.r.t, any context set C. We 
call, for example, the characteristic B ~ F(C) correct w.r.t, the 
characteristic .4 c F(C), iff A c_ B. 
(c) 7 is valuated w.r.t. (C,F(C),Pc), iff Pc: F(C)--* R~- is a finite 
measure on C which fulfills (Vc ~ C)(Pc({C})> 0). In this case 
(C, F(C), Pc) is called a context measure space. 
Valuated vague characteristics show a formal analogy to the concept of 
random sets recommended by Matheron [20, 21] and Nguyen [22], though 
the semantic differences of the two approaches are made clear by the fact 
that the co-domains of random sets contain set-valuated ata to be 
considered as indivisible objects, whereas the most important application 
field of a vague characteristic 7 ~ Fc(D) refers to its interpretation as an 
imperfect description of the actual state of an object obj, given some frame 
conditions cond, where state(obj, cond) ~ D. Hence, random sets specify 
vague concepts or vague properties, but using 7 ~ Fc(D) as a vague 
characteristic, the context-dependent selections 7(c), c ~ C, reflect the 
imprecision involved in the characterization f state(obj, cond) with respect 
to context c. The selections 7(c) signal that state(obj, cond) ~ 7(c) is 
supposed to be valid, whenever the individual frame conditions of context 
c are correct for state(obj, cond). 
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Apart from these differences the reader who is familiar with random set 
theory will find some known basic notations. 
From a decision-making point of view we intend to valuate the accep- 
tance degree ACCv(A), A ~ F(D), that the proposition state(obj, 
cond) ~ A is true. If we abstract from the given object state to the 
underlying elementary characteristic OrigvDf{state(obj, cond)}, the so- 
called original of y, then y should be viewed as a simplified representation 
of a set of context-precise characteristics, into which y may be specialized, 
each of them with selections that are possible to equal Origv. 
The inherent imprecision of y does not allow to uniquely determine 
acceptance degrees ACCv(A), A ~ F(D), but to calculate upper and 
lower bounds for them, like done the similar way in random set theory, the 
theory of upper and lower probabilities, and Dempster-Shafer theory. 
DEFINITION 3 Let y ~ Fc°(D). 
SeI(T) Df {sIs: Cr ~ Dand (Vc ~ Cr)(S(c) ~ y(c))} 
denotes the set of all selectors of y. 
In the special case of an empty characteristic we define Sel(extc[~]) DZ (~. 
Remark 4 Let y ~ Fc°(D) and %: Sel(y) ~ Fc(D), determined 
by (VS ~ Sel(y))(Vc ~ C)((%(S))(c) = {S(c)}). %(Sel(y)) consists of all 
context-precise characteristics, to which 3' may be specialized. 
Obviously each selector S c Sel(y) is measurable w.r.t. Pc. S induces 
the finite measure Ps: ~ ~ R~d, Ps(A)°=f Pc (S-I(A)) related to the 
measurable space (D, ~,~), where ~' is expected to be an appropriate 
o--field w.r.t.D. 
If Origr ~ F(D) is the original of %(S), then Pc(S-I(A)) quantifies the 
measure of all contexts c of C, for which there exists a data element 
a c A, so that q~r(S) is c-correct w.r.t. {a}. This is the measure of all 
contexts that do not contradict the proposition Origy _c A. For that reason 
we call Pc(S-I(A)) the acceptance degree of A w.r.t.S. 
The undermentioned definition generalizes the notion of an acceptance 
degree from selectors to the underlying vague characteristics. 
DEFINITION 5 Let 3' ~ F°(D) be valuated w.r.t. (C, F(C), Pc). Further- 
more let ~ be an appropriate o'-field w.r.t. D, and A ~ ~.  
ACC (A) Df inf{Pc(S-~(A))lS ~ Sel(y)} 
is the minimum acceptance degree (necessity), 
ACCr(A) Dfsup{Pc(S-l(A))lS ~ Sel(y)} 
is the maximum acceptance degree (possibility) 
of A w.r.t. 3'. 
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As shown by the following proposition, it is no problem to support an 
efficient computation of acceptance degrees: 
PROPOSITION 6 Let y ~ F°(D) be valuated w.r.t. (C, F(C), Pc). Then, 
for all A ~ ~ \ {O}, 
ACC (A)  = Pc({C ~ CIf~ ~ T(c )  ___A}); 
ACC~, (A)  = Pc({C ~ C I0  34= T(c) NA}). 
Let Origv c D be an unknown original and y ~ F°(D) its corresponding 
vague characterization, valuated w.r.t, a context measure space (C, F(C), 
Pc). Furthermore suppose to have ACCv(A) and ACCs(A), where a ~ ~'  
refers to an appropriate measure space (D, ~'). 
Then, we are asked to justify how to come to a decision w.r.t. Orig v. 
Such decision-making aspects will be investigated in section 5, when 
different ypes of operations on vague characteristics have been discussed. 
3. OPERATIONS ON VAGUE CHARACTERIST ICS 
Up to now we have considered the representation, interpretation, and 
valuation of imperfect knowledge by the context model. In this section 
we introduce the most important operations on vague characteristics, 
which are specialization (i.e., conditioning, data revision), combination, 
accumulation, refinement, and coarsening. The mentioned operations are 
indispensable to provide a model for reasoning in the presence of partial 
ignorance. 
In the first instance we restrict ourselves to the investigation of opera- 
tions on imprecise characteristics. Suppose Ai, B i ~ F(Di), i = 1, 2 . . . .  , n, 
and a function f: ×n F(Di) --* F(D). As the correctness of A i w.r.t. i=1  
B i for every i = 1 ,2 , . . . ,n  does not necessarily imply the correctness 
of f (A  1 . . . . .  A n) w.r.t, f (B  1 . . . . .  Bn), we obviously have to be careful in 
accepting only reasonable operations on characteristics. Hence we intro- 
duce the concepts of correctness- and contradiction-preserving mappings, 
respectively. 
DEFINITION 7 Let D1, D 2 . . . .  , D n, D be frames of  discernment and 
f: X~= i F(D/) ~ F(D) a function. 
(a) f is called correctness-preserving, ff f ( A 1 . . . . .  A n) ~ f (  B 1 . . . . .  B n) 
for all Ai ,  B i with A i c_ B i cc_ Di, i = 1, 2 . . . . .  n. 
(b) f is called contradiction-preserving, ff 
(VA1, . . . ,  A~) ( (3 i  ~ {1 . . . . .  n})(A~ = •) 
= f (A  1 . . . . .  An) = Q) 
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Remark 8 
(a) Let Ai, B i E F(Di), A i c Di, B i c_Di, i = 1 , . . . ,n ,  and f: xn=l 
F(Di) ~ F(D). If (Vi ~ {1,2 . . . . .  n})(B i correct w.r.t. A i) and 
f correctness-preserving, then f (B1 , . . . ,B , )  is correct w.r.t. 
f (A1, . . . ,  A,). 
(b) Each function f:  X 7= 1 Di ~ D with D1, O 2 . . . .  , Dn, D 4: O 
induces a correctness- and contradiction-preserving mapping 
f:  Xn=l F(D i) ~ F(D), given by f (A1 , . . . ,  An)°- f f (A1 X 
A 2 X "" XA . ) .  
(c) The Boolean algebra (F(D), •, U, ~)  consists of the two 
correctness-preserving operators n, u ,  while ~ is not correctness- 
preserving. Furthermore only n is contradiction-preserving. 
(d) Compositions of correctness-preserving (contradiction-preserving) 
mappings are themselves correctness-preserving (contradiction- 
preserving). 
Let us now change over to operations on vague characteristics Yi ~ Fc 
(Di), i = 1 , . . . ,n ,  that refer to a common context measure space (C, 
F(C), Pc). We assume that the operations on Yl . . . . .  3', are induced by the 
extension f of mappings f:  X n F(Di) ~ F(D) to the given set C of i=1  
contexts. 
n DEFINITION 9 Let f: X i= a F(Di) ~ F(D) be a function and Yi ~ 
Fc(Di), i = 1, 2 , . . . ,  n. The vague characteristic f (Yl . . . .  Yn) ~ Fc(D), 
defined by ( f (Y l , . . .  y,))(c) °=f f (y l (c ) , . . ,  y,(c)) is called the vague image 
of (3'1 . . . .  Yn) under f. 
In the following subsections we apply the concept of vague images to 
different ypes of operations on imperfect data. 
3.1. Specialization Concepts: Context Conditioning vs. Data Revision 
Let y ~ Fc(D) be the specification of a vague observation w.r.t, an 
elementary characteristic Orig~ ~ F(D). 
Suppose that further evidence on Origv--to be formalized by a vague 
characteristic v c Fc(D)--becomes available. 
If we claim the correctness of v w.r.t. Orig,, then there are two 
important justifiable specializations of y by u, which are context condition- 
ing and data revision, respectively. Both are structure-preserving, but 
data-adjusting operations on cooperating vague characteristics referred to 
the same set of contexts and the same domain. 
Context conditioning is mainly related to the competition property 
within the vague characteristic y, because it restricts the set Cv of 
non-contradictory contexts to exactly those contexts c ~ C, where the 
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selection v(c) is correct w.r.t, all possible specializations of the given 
imprecise observation 7(c) into elementary characteristics of D. 
On the other hand data revision is referred to the imprecision property 
of 7. Data revision does not question the acceptance of contexts on 
principle, but specializes the selections 7(c) based on the assumed 
correctness of v w.r.t. Orig,. 
Hence data revision specializes imprecise observations, whereas context 
conditioning is limited to the alternatives either to leave imprecise obser- 
vations unchanged or to make them contradictory. 
DEFINITION 10 Let 7, v ~ Fc(D). 
(1) 7Iv: C --* F(D), (TlV)(C)Df [~!C), iffT(C) C_ V(C) 
~,  otherwise 
is called context conditioning of 3' by v. 
of 
(2) 7,: C ~ F(D), %(c) = 7(c) n v(c) 
is named data revision of 7 by v. 
Remark 11 
(a) Context conditioning and data revision may be interpreted as exten- 
sions of operations on imprecise) characteristics: 
Define 
cond: F(D) × F(D) ~ F(D), cond(A, B) Df [A, iff A c_ B 
~5, otherwise 
rev: F(D) X F(D) ~ F(D), rev(A, B) ~fA n B. 
Then for all 7, 1, ~ Fc(D) we obtain 7Iv = con_.d(7, v) and % = 
re v( 7, v). 
It should be emphasized that the functions cond and rev are 
contradiction-preserving, but only rev fulfills the property of 
correctness-preservation. This fact entails the anomaly of the con- 
text conditioning concept hat it tends to manipulate the valuation 
of 71u by rejection of contexts c ~ C with allocated selection 7(c) 
of minor specificity. For this reason we have to tolerate the restric- 
tive applicability of the context conditioning concept, where in the 
special case of context-precise characteristics (which are known to 
be suitable for the representation of discrete probability distribu- 
tions) context-conditioning coincides with data revision. 
(b) Let 7, v ~ Fc(D), Q5 ~ A ___ D, c ~ C. 
If 7 is c-correct w.r.t. A and u c-correct w.r.t. A, then % and 7[v 
are c-correct w.r.t.A. 
3.2. Coordination Concepts: Combination vs. Accumulation 
Whenever we specialize a vague characteristic 3' ~ Fc(D) by another 
vague characteristic v ~ Fc(D) we may view ~, as a vague fact that helps us 
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in finding a more specific vague observation of the underlying elementary 
characteristic Orig~ ~ F(D). 
While specializations are always referred to cooperating vague cha- 
racteristics with the same domain and the same set of contexts, we 
now consider operations on competing vague characteristics with a 
common domain, but disjoint sets of contexts, namely the structure- 
modifying combination and the structure-preserving accumulation of vague 
characteristics. 
Let Yi ~ Fc,(D), i --- 1 . . . .  , n, be vague characteristics that are related to 
the same original characteristic, i.e., Or ig , , - -Or ig ,2  . . . . .  Orig~. A 
combination of 7~ . . . . .  7n consists of two separable actions, which are the 
structure-modifying coordination of the corresponding context sets C1, 
C2, . . . ,  Cn to a single context set C, and the coordination of all selections 
of 7~, 72, . - . ,  3'n w.r.t, this integrating context set C by application of an 
appropriate combination function. 
Obviously the most general coordination of contexts is reached when we 
define C to be the cartesian product of C~ . . . . .  C n. 
Hence we state the following: 
DEFINITION 12 Let  Yi ~ Fc,(D), i = 1, 2 . . . . .  n, be eague characteristics 
o f  D w.r.t .  C i. Assume that CI, C 2 . . . .  , C n are pairwise disjoint. Further- 
more let c D=f c I  × C 2 × ... × C , ,  and let comb: (F(D)) n ~ F(D) be a 
correctness- and contradict ion-preseming combinat ion funct ion.  
Furthermore we define 
comb:  F(D n) --* F (D) ,  
comb D=fcomb( Tr l ( A ) , . . . , 7rn ( A ) ) , 
where 7ri( A )  denotes the project ion o f  A into the i-th coordinate space. The 
vague characteristic comb(y1  ® ... ® Yn) ~ Fc (Dn), 
(~'~ ® "'" ~ 3'n)((c~ . . . . .  Cn)) DI71(c~) X " .  X 7n(Cn) 
iS called the combinat ion o f  Yl . . . .  , Yn w.r.t,  comb. 
Remark 13 
(a) Let Q =~ A i C Di, ~1 i ~ Fc,(D) , c i E Ci, i = 1, 2 . . . . .  n. 
I f  (Vi ~ {-1, 2 . . . . .  n})('y i c/-correct w.r.t. Ai ) ,  
then comb(y1 ® "'" ® Yn) is (c 1 . . . . .  cn)-correct w.r.t. 
co"--'mb (A1 . . . . .  An). 
(b) The set-theoretical intersection is an example of a well-known 
conjunctive combination function, but note that the set-theoretical 
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union does not fulfill the contradiction-preserving property. Never- 
theless we may use a modified disjunctive combination function, 
defined by 
fu :  F (D)  × F (D)  ~ F (D) ,  
~f[A UB, iffA 4=QandB~ 
fu (A 'B)  ~O, i f fA  = ~3orB  =~3 
(e) If Yi ~ Fc,(D), i=  1,2 . . . . .  n, are valuated w.r.t. (Ci, F(C/), Pc), 
then comb(y  1® ... ® 7,) is valuated w.r.t. (C,F(C),Pc) ,  where 
Pc Df @ n ~I  n Pc,( C* ) for all = i=1 Pc,, i.e., Pc(C'~ x . . .  × C*) = i=1 
C* g Ci, i = 1,2 . . . . .  n. 
Note that the application of the product measure Pc requires the 
typical measure-theoretical independence assumption. 
The combination of competing vague characteristics is a structure- 
modifying operation, because it generates a new set of contexts and 
therefore--applying a combination function--modif ied imprecise charac- 
teristics as selections within the new contexts. Combination is motivated by 
structural relationships between the involved context measure spaces. 
An alternative approach to the coordination of vague characteristics 
refers to the introduction of a structure-preserving operation that restricts 
itself to the union of the given context sets. In this case we suppose 
irrelative context measure spaces, but apart from that the same frame 
conditions as mentioned for combination. 
DEFINITION 14 Let ]/i ~ Fci(D), i = 1, 2 . . . .  , n, be vague characteristics 
of D w.r.t. C i. Furthermore let C 1, C2, . . . ,  C~ be pairwise disjoint, and 
define C D=f 137= 1 Ci. 
The vague characteristic ~ ~ i= 1 Yi ~ Fc(D), given by 
n Df (~ y i=y l  * ' " *%,  
i=1  
of  
(3,~ • "'" • 3 , . ) (c )  = ~, i (c) ,  
iffc ~C i, i=  1 . . . . .  n, 
is called the accumulation of Yl . . . . .  Yn- 
Remark 15 If Yi ~ Fc,(D), i = 1,2 . . . . .  n, are valuated w.r.t (Ci, 
F(Ci), Pc),  then @n i i=1 Ti is valuated w.r.t. (C, F(C), Pc), where 
pcDf ~ni=~ Pc, and ~"i=1Pc(C*)D-fE7 _ Pc(C* N Ci). 
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3.3. Refinement and Coarsening 
As we have already pointed out, the main purpose of the concept of 
vague characteristics y ~ Fc(D) is to specify vague observations of state- 
dependent attribute values related to an object under consideration. One 
main aspect for the specification of vague characteristics i  the choice of 
the domain D and the context set C, which depends on the available 
information about the given object in its actual state. It is obvious that a 
more detailed registration of all important frame conditions permits a 
refinement of C and D, respectively. Refinement does not mean that we 
add a number of contexts (like done by the connection of contexts) or 
supply further elementary characteristics (which could be interpreted as a 
contradiction to our closed work assumption), but rather the disintegration 
of each context c ~ C into subcontexts, and the division of data elements 
d ~ D into finer pieces, respectively. For this reason we formalize the 
concepts of refinement and coarsening (as the reverse operation) within 
the context model. 
DEFINITION 16 Let C, C* be two context sets. C* is a refinement of C, 
i.e., C E o C*, iff there exists a surjective mapping O: C* ~ C. 
In this case O is called a context-reduction-function. The measure space 
(C*, F(C*), Pc*) is called the refinement of (C, F(C), Pc), iff C* is a 
refinement of C and (Vc ~ C)(Pc({C}) = Pc,({c* ~ C*[c = O(c*)})). 
DEFINITION 17 Let C and C* be context sets, O: C* ~ C a context- 
reduction-function a d D a domain. Dependent from D and Q we define 
the following mappings: 
(a) Refo: Fc(D) ~ Fc,(D), 
(Vy e Fc(D)XVc* E C*)(nefo(y)(c*) = y(O(c*))); 
(b) Coars%: rc , (D)  ~ rc(D),  
(Vy* ~ rc,(D))(Vc ~ CXCoars%(y*Xc) = U{y*(c*)[c* ~ C* /x 
c ~ O(c*)}). 
Let y ~ Fc(D) and y* ~ Fc,(D). 
Refo(y) is called context-refinement of y w.r.t. 0- 
Coars%(y*) is the context-coarsening of y* w.r.t. 0. 
PROPOSITION 18 Let C Ee C*, c ~ C, c* ~ C*, y ~ Fc(D), y* 
Fc.(D), and ~ ~ A c D. 
(a) y c-correct w.r.t. A ,~, 
(Vc* ~ C*)(Q(c*) = c ~ RefQ(y) c*-correct w.r.t. A) 
(b) y c*-correct w.r.t. A 
(Vc ~ C)(Q(c*) = c ~ Coars%(y*) c-correct w.r.t. A) 
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DEFINITION 19 Let D, D* be two domains. D* is a refinement olD,  i.e., 
D E e D*, iffthere exists a surjective data-reduction-function 6: D* ~ D. 
Related to an arbitrary context set C we define the following mappings: 
(a) Refa: rc(D) ~ rc(D*) ,
(V3" ~ Fc(D)XVc e C)(Refs(3"Xc) = 6-1(T(C) ) ) ;  
(b) Coarses: Fc(D*) ---* Fc(D), 
('¢3"* ~ Fc(D*))(Vc ~ C)(Coarse~(3"*Xc) = 6(3"*(c))). 
Let y ~ Fc(D) and T* ~ Fc(D*). 
Rely(3,) is called data-refinement of 3' w.r.t. 6. 
Coars%(3"*) is the data-coarsening of 3'* w.r.t. 6. 
PROPOSITION 20 Let D E e D*, c E C, 3" E Fc(D) , 3'* ~ Fc(D*), and 
Q :~A c_D, O :/:A* c_D*. 
(a) T c-correct w.r.t. A ~, Rely(7) c-correct w.r.t. 6 l(A) 
(b) T* c*-correct w.r.t. A* ~ Coars%(T*) c-correct w.r.t. 6(A*). 
Remark 21 The proposed efinitions coincide with the corresponding 
operations suggested by Sharer [9] connected with the application of belief 
functions. Furthermore it should be pointed out that even nonmonotonic 
reasoning may be handled within the context model if we, for example, 
operate on vague characteristics by a composition of context refinement 
and data revision. 
4. MASS DISTRIBUTIONS 
In connection with uncertainty modeling considerations we have shown 
the efficient computation of the minimum/maximum acceptance degree 
of a characteristic A ~ F(D) to be a generalization of the inaccessible 
original Orig v ~ F(D) of a vague characteristic valuated w.r.t, a context 
measure space (C, F(C), Pc): 
(a) ACC-r(A) = Pc({C ~ CIQ ~ y(c) c A}); 
(b) ACCv(A) = Pc({C ~ C[3'(c) v~ A ~ Q}). 
The given representation f ACCv(A) and ACCv(A) is directly referred 
to the underlying contexts. As an alternative--motivated by the additivity 
property of measures--it s promising to use a representation based on 
valuations of the characteristics ontained in the set 3'(C) of all selections 
of y. 
DEFINITION 22 Let 3' ~ Fc(D) be valuated w.r.t. (C, F(C), Pc). 
my: F(D) ~ R~, mv(A)Dfpc({C ~ CI3'(c) =A} is called the mass 
distribution of 3,. 
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PROPOSITION 23 Let 7 ~ F°(D) be valuated w.r.t. ( C, F(C), Pc). For all 
A E F(D) we obtain 
(a) ACCr(A)  = EB ~ r(c): ~ B ~ A mr(B), 
(h) ACCr(A)  = EB e r(c): A n B ~ mr(B) .  
The following propositions how how to get the resulting mass distribu- 
tions of the most important operations on valuated vague characteristics 
by means of the mass distributions of the participating operands. Further- 
more the essence of well-known concepts of Dempster-Shafer theory with 
an analogous concept of mass distributions is made evident. 
PROPOSITION 24 (mass distribution of specializations) Let 7, v ~ Fc(D) 
be valuated w.r.t. (C, F(C), Pc). Moreover let A ~ F(D). 
Pc((C ~ C IA  = 7(c)  _c u(c))) ,  iff A v~ 
(a) mrr~(A) = Pc({C ~ Cl7(c)  +c ~,(c)}), iff A = Q 
:ontext conditioning) 
(b) mr~(A)  = m r o ~ (data revision) 
Remark 25 
(a) In the special case (Vc ~ C) (0  ~ A c_ u(c)) we obtain turin(A) = 
mr(A) ,  but there is no general dependency between mrl ~ and 
m r, m~. 
(h) The data revision of mass distributions turns out to be compatible 
with Dempster's rule of conditioning [9], if we disregard the nor- 
malization factor due to the application of probability measures in 
Dempster-Shafer-theory. Note that there is no justification of a 
normalization within the context model. 
PROPOSITION 26 (mass distributions of coordinations) Let Yi E F°(D), 
i = 1, 2 . . . . .  n be valuated w.r.t. (Ci, F(Ci), Pc) ,  where Cl, C 2 . . . .  , C n are 
pairwise disjoint sets o f  contexts. 
Define C Df C1 X C 2 X ".. X Cn, C'  Df C1 U C 2 U "" U C n, and choose 
a combination function comb: (F(D)) n -o F(D). 
Let A c_ D. 
17 n mr(  A i )  (a) mco,--~(rl ® ..®ro)(A) = EA . . . . . .  An: comb(A . . . . . .  A . )=A i=1  , 
(combination) 
(b) m~l e .. e r (A)  = )ZT= a mr(A)  (accumulation) 
Remark 27 The combination of mass distributions of vague character- 
istics coincides with Dempster's rule of combination [9] if normalization 
conditions are ignored. 
PROPOSITION 28 (mass distributions of refinements) Let 7 ~ Fc(D) be 
valuated w.r.t. ( C, F(C), Pc). Suppose to have a context-reduction-function 
O: C* -o C 
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and a data-reduction-function 6: D* + D. Let A E l?(D) and A* E 
I?( D*>, respectively. 










Let v E l?,*(D) be valuated w.r.t. the refinement (C*, I(C*), PC*> of 
(C, T(C), Pc). Then, for all A E T(D), m,(A) = P&C* E C*l 
v(c*) = A)). Let CT, cz E {c* E C*Iv(c*) = A}. Since in general 
(Coarse,(v>X e<cT )) # (Coarse& v)X e(cz )>, with the exception of 
special cases there is no direct representation of mcoarseQ(vj by m,. 
Let v E rc’,(D*) be valuated w.r.t. (C, I(C), PC>. For all A E 
T(D), the following relationship is valid: mCoarse (“)(A) = PC 
({c E ClCoarse,(vXc) = A)) = P&c E CJG(v(c)) = A}) 2 P&c E 
Clv(c) = 6-‘(A))) = m,(6-‘(A)), because V(C) c 6P’(6(~(c))). 
For this reason there is in general no direct representation of 
~~~~~~~~~~~ by 6. 
5. DECISION-MAKING ASPECTS 
The task of decision-making as the final step of an inference process 
based on the concept of valuated vague characteristics concerns the for- 
malization of someone’s betting behavior with respect to the truth of 
statements of the type Orig, G A, A E r(D), where Orig, is interpre- 
ted as the (unknown) original of the given valuated vague characteristic 
y E lY~o(D) which specifies a vague observation of Origy w.r.t. the domain 
D and the context space (C, I(C), PC). 
Minimizing the betting risk, exhausting the whole information about 
Origy contained in y and (C, T(C), P,), and trying to be as fair as pos- 
sible, we are caused to provide the following betting behavior: 
Let B,, B, be two betters and S,, S, their stakes, where S, + S, = 
P,(C). 
B, bets on Orig,, c A versus Orig,g A, B, vice versa. B, accepts the 
bet, iff S, -< ACC&(A) and S, 2 ACC,XD \ A). On the other hand B, 
accepts the bet, iff S, I AC&CD \ A) and S, 2 ACCJA). 
In most situations the carefulness of both betters will prevent us from 
coming to a decision. Formally spoken, a decision is only possible if y is a 
context-precise characteristic. 
As an example consider the case P,(C) = 1, where y induces the 
discrete probability distribution {(d, P,(y-‘({d})))ld E U{y(c)lc E Cl1 
on D. 
298 J6rg Gebhardt and Rudolf Kruse 
The mentioned decision problem motivates the introduction of addi- 
tional restrictive assumptions that enable us to calculate a single accep- 
tance degree ACC~(A)= ACCr(A)= ACCr(A)  as the foundation for 
the required decision. 
A promising point of attachment is the application of the insufficient 
reason principle that is a well-known concept of Bayes theory. Transferred 
to our model it says that we have to assume a uniform distribution on 
each selection y(c) of the vague characteristic y under consideration. The 
justification of this assumption rests on the fact that with respect o the 
information available by T and (C, F(C), Pc) it is not possible to favor one 
of the elementary characteristics ontained in T(c) related to any chosen 
context c ~ C. Otherwise we could use a modified specification of the 
vague observation of Orig,. 
Obviously the consideration of the phenomenon of imprecision moti- 
vates the application of the insufficient reason principle. Conflict, on the 
other hand, interpreted as the occurrence of competing observation con- 
texts, canonically leads to the generalized insufficient reason principle, 
which is- - for  example--conform to the corresponding axiomatically 
induced principle within the transferable belief model [12]. 
The following definition states the underlying bet function. 
DEFINITION 30 Let D be a domain with D c_ ~n or IDI e ~. Let 
3' ~ F~(D) be valuated w.r.t. (C, F(C), Pc), fulfilling (Vc ~ C)(y(c) 
~) ,  where ~ is an appropriate ~r-field w.r.t. D. Furthermore suppose to 
have the probability space (D, ~,  Po), where PD induces the uniform 
distribution on D. 
We call 
bet~: ~ ~ [0, 1], 
betr( A) Df [ Pc(Cr)] -1 pc({C} ) . pD( AIT(C)) E 
c~C:  
T(c)nA ~ 
the bet function of T w.r.t. (C, F(C), Pc). 
Remark 31 The betting behavior induced by the generalized insuffi- 
cient reason principle may be described as follows: Let B0, B 1 be two 
betters and So, S 1 their stakes, where S O + S 1 = 1. B 0 bets on Origr ___ A 
versus Orig~ g A, B 1 vice versa. B 0 and B 1 accept he bet, iff S O = betr(A)  
and S 1 = 1 - betr(A). 
5.1. The "Spoiled Sandwich" Effect 
An important requirement for the acceptability of any model of partial 
ignorance is its conformity with fundamental principles of plausible rea- 
soning that serve as a basis for rational decision-making. One of these 
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well-known principles is the so-called sandwich metaphor [23, 24] that 
states the following rule: 
For any proposition A ~ F(D) and any assumption or evidence E 
F(D), E 4: g,  we expect o calculate 
rain{Belief(AlE), Belief(AID \ E)} 
< Belief(A) 
< max{Belief(AbE), Belief(AID \ E)}. 
The motivation for this principle--translated to decision situations-- 
refers to the idea that nobody needs to engage in unnecessary knowledge 
acquisition or experimentation [24]: 
"If a person would choose the same action for every possible outcome of 
an experiment, hen he or she ought to choose that action without running 
the experiment." 
As natural as such a principle might look at the first glance, there are 
still controversal discussions on the question, whether the sandwich prin- 
ciple should be regarded as a general principle for plausible reasoning 
[24-27]. It is easy to prove that conditioning of probability measures 
coincides with the sandwich principle, whereas data revision of belief 
functions by Dempster's rule of conditioning contradicts it [24]. In our 
opinion the main point regarding the relevance of the sandwich principle is 
to understand that it is referred to uncertain, but precise data, which 
means that imprecision aspects are not covered by the sandwich principle. 
Let us explain this remark by application of the context model, where 
decision-making depends on bet functions betr induced by valuated vague 
characteristics y ~ Fc(D) on an underlying context measure space (C, 
F(C), Pc). We notice that 3' realizes the strict separation of observation 
contexts (specified by C) and possible states of the object under considera- 
tion (specified by D). From the formal point of view it is obvious, but 
nevertheless worth mentioning that only contexts are valuated, and that 
each context holds its individual (imprecise) selection 3"(c) of object states. 
This unidirectional dependency between contexts and data values has the 
essential consequence that conditioning as well as data revision operations 
based on an evidence E, E ~ F(D), are not expected to affect the relative 
valuations of non-contradictory (i.e., 3'(c) :~ •) contexts. Thus, accepting 
the sandwich principle in general, we have no chance to avoid the necessity 
of unreasonable changes of relative context valuations. Since the assertion 
of the sandwich principle is related to the data set D, but not directly to 
the context set C, we have to accept hat its relevance is restricted to the 
case, where all contexts c are identifiable with their attached selections 
3"(c), which reflects the need for the validity of the sandwich principle for 
all context-precise characteristics. 
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As this special kind of vague characteristic is exactly the one used in 
Bayesian-like applications of the context model, it should not be surprising 
that context-precise characteristics fit the sandwich principle as shown in 
the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 3.2 Let y ~ F~(D) be a context-precise vague characteris- 
tic which is valuated w.r.t. (C, F(C), Pc). Then, for all A ~ F(D) and 
E ~ F(D), E =g •, we have 
min{bet~lextc(E)( A), betylextc(D\ E)( A ) } 
< bet~(A) 
< max{betz, lextc(E)(A), bet~Jextc(D\E)(A)}. 
5.2. The Three Prisoners Problem 
The three prisoners problem is one of the most quoted and discussed 
examples concerning the applicability of Dempster-Shafer theory, espe- 
cially Dempster's rules of conditioning and combination, respectively. 
Controversal viewpoints regarding the solution of this problem are still 
pending. The problem itself is stated as follows: 
Let A~, A 2, and A 3 be three prisoners. One of the prisoners is chosen 
by the warden to be executed, the others to be saved. 
Assume that the choice is given by random draw among the three 
candidates. Prisoner A 1 asks the guard to name one of the prisoners 
(different from A 1) who will be saved, arguing that such information 
would clearly be of little help to him with respect o his potential fate. 
We suppose that the guard (who is expected to know the decision of the 
warden) names A 2, where no further information is available than the 
reliability of the given answer. Should A~'s opinion about his fate be 
modified? 
First of all, we analyze the three prisoners problem by application of the 
context model. The analysis turns out to be quite simple caused by the 
strong semantics of the concepts used within the context model. 
Obviously the three prisoners tory consists of two parts, which are the 
choice of the prisoner to be executed, and the statement of the guard that 
is influenced by the result of that choice. 
Related to the first part we distinguish the observation contexts Cz, 
i = 1, 2, 3, specified by the assumption that c z corresponds to the execution 
of A i. The considered object obj of interest is an abstract one which is 
characterized by the name of the prisoner to be executed, i.e., Dom 
(obj) ~f {A1, A2, A3}. 
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As we know that the choice of the prisoner to be executed is repre- 
sentable by the uniform distribution Dom(obj), we obtain the following 
valuated characteristic: 
y: C ~ F (D) ,  
Df 
y(C i) = {A i} ,  
CO~-'f {C1,C2,C3} , D Df {A1,A2,A3};  
i = 1,2,3. 
The underlying context measure space (C, F(C), Pc) is determined by 
pc({Ci}) Of x = 5, i = 1,2,3. 
Hence the a priori valuation of A 1 to be chosen for execution is 
1 
ACC.y({A1})  = ACCy({A1})  = 5" 
Further information becomes available by the answer of the guard and the 
fact that he does not lie. The integration of the guard's statement induces 
a refinement (C*, F(C*), Pc ~) of the given context space, which is 
C* D~f{c12 , C13 , C23 , C32}, where 
% means that prisoner A i is to be executed and the guards names Aj. 
pc%({c12}) = 1 30~, P~,({¢13}) = ½(1 - a ) ,  
1 p~. ({c32})  = 1 Pc~'({c23}) = 5,  ~" 
The underlying context-reduction-function is defined by 
O: C* ~ C, 
~9(C12) Df~9(C13 ) ~fc1 ' 
0(C23 ) Dfc2, 
0(¢32 ) Dfc 3 . 
Note that Pc({Ci}) = Pc,({c* ~ C*lc i = Q(c*)}). 
The value of a reflects that we have no information about the decision 
behavior of the guard, if A 1 is the prisoner who will be executed. 
Since a ~ [0, 1], we have changed over to the family {(C*, F(C*), Pc%)] a 
[0, 1]} of context measure spaces. 
Besides the refinement of the context measure space we observe 
refinement of the domain, because the answer of the guard offers more 
additional data. 
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The refined domain is D* °=f {A 1, A2, A3} 2, where (Ai, A j )~  D*, i, 
j ~ {1, 2, 3}, means that prisoner A i will be executed and the guard names 
Aj. As the corresponding data-reduction function we obtain 8: D* ---, D, 
~((Ai, Aj)) ~=Ai, i, j = 1, 2, 3. 
Now we are in the position to include the evidence E based on the 
statement of the guard. On the formal level the fact that A 2 will be served 
is expressed by the data set 
EDf {Aa, A2,A3} × {A2}. 
Hence, we define the following valuated vague characteristic: 
Y*: C* -o F(D*), 
,~,(C12 ) Df {(A1 ' A2)},_ 
y*(c13) D=U{(A1, A3)}, 
"~*(C23 ) Of {(A2, A3)}, 
~*(C32 ) Df {(A3, A2)}. 






Considering D* the event that A 1 
{A1, A2, A3}. 
F(D*) 
= {(A1, A2)}, 
= {(A3,A2)}. 
will be executed is given by A °--f{A 1} × 
Thus ACCyy(A) = ACCz,*(A) = 1 ~O~, 
~a(~ + ½a) -I i.e., bety.(A) ~ [0, ½], and bet~,(A) = a 1 
where the assumption that the guard flips a fair coin when he knows that 
A 1 will be executed (i.e., a = ½) leads to 
1 bet~.(A) = ~. 
To summarize our results, the context model's solution of the three 
prisoners problem confirms Pearl's analysis [24, 26] which is obtained 
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through a Bayesian approach. Pearl does not accept the solution by 
intuitive application of belief functions [26] that delivers bel(A 1 will be 
1 executed I guard names A 2) = ~. 
It should be emphasized that also the context model does not endorse 
that solution, but it furthermore clarifies the problems that occur 
by an incautious application of Dempster's rules of combination and 
conditioning, respectively. 
The context model's analysis does not require any a priori decision of 
using Bayes theory, Dempster-Shafer theory, or, for example, the transfer- 
able belief model. It does nothing more than to strictly transform what we 
exactly know about the three prisoners problem into a pleasant formal 
environment. The most relevant step of this transformation is due to the 
definition of the vague characteristic y*: C* ---, F(D*) which is valuated 
w.r.t, context measure spaces (C*, F(C*), Pc%), a ~ [0, 1]. Since y* arises 
to be context-precise, having pairwise disjoint context-dependent selections 
y*(c*), each element of the context space C* is identified by exactly one 
element of D*, which is the typical property of a Bayesian-like analysis 
within the context model. 
On the other hand the general Dempster-Shafer analysis is not restric- 
ted to elementary selections y*(C*), but also accepts imprecise context- 
dependent data. Thus, the three prisoners problem is a good example for 
the inevitability of a Bayesian-like numerical analysis, which means that a 
serious Dempster-Shafer analysis should therefore come to the same 
result. Indeed, using the mass distribution my, induced by y*, which is 
my.: F(D*) ~ [0,1], m~,(A)~fP~. ({c  * ~ C*]y(c*) =A}), a ~ [0,1], we 
calculate the correct solution. 
It should not be concealed that the Dempster-Shafer-like analysis of 
the three prisoners problem by the context model questions (like Pearl 
[24]), whether the straightforward application of belief functions can serve 
as a basis for decision-making, because mass distributions and belief 
functions (which are similar to normalized minimum acceptance degrees) 
are not fundamental, but induced concepts holding imprecision to be 
removed by bet functions. 
6. WHAT IS THE DEMPSTER-SHAFER-SMETS MODEL? 
In this section we outline essential remarks regarding the interpretation 
of the Dempster-Shafer-Smets model (DSSM) within the context model. 
The Dempster-Shafer-Smets model reflects Smets' "non-probabilistic" 
view of Dempster-Shafer theory, modified by the idea of transferring basic 
belief assignments due to data revision [12]. For this reason Smets himself 
calls it the transferable belief model. 
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First of all we summarize the basic ideas of the DSSM as they are 
introduced by Smets in [12]. 
Let 1~ be a nonempty finite set, called the frame of discernment, and 
(2 a, n ,  u ,  ~)  the induced Boolean algebra of propositions on O. The 
description of our subjective personal judgment that propositions of 2 a are 
true, is called a credal state on the propositional space (l~,2a). It is 
formalized by a mapping val: f~ ~ {true, false}, where [val-l({true})[--- 1, 
which means that the truth lies in exactly one of the elements of ~. 
Suppose that {w0} = val-l({true}). A proposition A E 2 a is called true, 
i f f  w 0 ~ A .  
A basic principle of the DSSM postulates that the impact of an evidence 
on w 0 consists of allocating parts of an initial unitary amount of belief 
among the propositions of F(I~). The mentioned allocation is defined 
by a basic belief assignment m: 2a~ [0, 1], fulfilling the condition 
Y'~A: A ~ 2 ~ m(A) = 1. 
If further evidence becomes available and implies that the truth is in a 
subset B of fl, i.e., oJ 0 ~ B, then the belief m(A) initially allocated to 
A ~ F(ID is transferred to A n B. 
The resulting basic belief assignment is defined by Dempster's rule of 
conditioning: 
ms(A) :  2 a ~ [0, 1], 
c. ~_, m(A U X) ,  iffA___B 
mB( A ) Df X: Xc_I I \B 
= tO, i f fA  ~B,  
where c D_$1 
( )1 
or c D_T 1 -- ~ m(X)  
X: X~t \B  
(Smets' proposal; normalization 
dropped), 
(Shafer's proposal; normalization). 
After this short introduction we change over to the context model: The 
mentioned credal state is an epistemic construct and relative to our 
knowledge. It is based on a not necessarily unknown finite set C of 
competing contexts of consideration that support the specification of 
imprecise observations of the not directly accessible lementary character- 
istic {¢o 0} _ 1~, where o~ 0 is a state-dependent at ribute value of the object 
under consideration. 
In the DSSM the valuated vague observation of {oJ 0} is specified by a 
basic belief assignment m: 2a~ [0,1]. Within the context model the 
mentioned observation of {o~ 0} is formalized by a valuated vague charac- 
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teristic y ~ Fc(fD with respect to the chosen set C of contexts and a 
valuating measure Pc: C ~ R~. Hence, the induced mass distribution mr: 
of 
2 a ~ R~, mv(A) = Pc({C ~ Ch7(c) = A}), A c_ 11, corresponds to the 
basic belief assignment m of the DSSM. 
If we know that the truth is in a subset B of 12, i.e., to ~ B, we postulate 
the correctness of B w.r.t. Orig v = {too}. 
So we have a data revision by the extension of B w.r.t.C. The revised 
of 
vague characteristic is Yextc[nl ~ Fc(fD, defined by ycxtc[B](C)= Y(c) A 
(extc[B])(c) = y(c) N B. 
Thus, for all A ~ 2 n, we calculate 
= Pc({C ~ C]y(c)  A B = A}) 
= ~ ec({C ~ cl~,(c) =x})  
X: XAB =A 
= ~_, my(X)  = Y'~ mv(A u X) ,  
X: X~B =A X: Xc I ' I \B  
which coincides with Smet's proposal of Dempster's unnormalized rule of 
conditioning. 
7. EXAMPLE: SOLUTION OF THE UNRELIABLE 
ALARM PARADIGM 
One of the examples that Smets [12] introduced to illustrate situ- 
ations where the DSSM leads to results different from those of its 
contenders--especially the Bayesian model-- is  referred to the valuation 
of propositions on the good behavior of a system in an environment 
of partial ignorance. The object to be characterized by a tuple of state- 
dependent attribute values consists of the system itself, a sensor, and an 
alarm bell. For this reason we consider the attribute values SYSTEM, 
SENSOR, and ALARM with their domains DOM(SYSTEM) D=I {on, down}, 
DOM(SENSOR) D=f {working, broken} and DOM(ALARM) of {ringing, 
quiet}, respectively. 
The following rules give a description of the general dependencies 
between the three attributes: 
RI: Probability(SENSOR = working) = 0.8; 
Probability(SENSOR = broken) = 0.2; 
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R2: If SENSOR = working 
then if SYSTEM = on 
then ALARM = quiet 
else ALARM = ringing 
else ALARM ~ {quiet, ringing}; 
R3: SENSOR and SYSTEM are independent from each other. 
No further information is available. 
Suppose that the alarm bell is ringing at a given time. What is our 
degree of belief that the system is down at this time? 
We will investigate this problem from two different points of view, both 
of them applications of the context model: one approach is based on the 
DSSM, the other one is adopted from Bayes theory. 
7.1. Solution Based on the Dempster-Shafer-Smets Model 
Obviously our frame of discernment is defined by 
1~ ~fDOM(SYSTEM) × DOM(SENSOR) × DOM(ALARM).  
With respect o the given rules R a, R 2, and R3, we establish that only R a 
supports valuation aspects. It permits the distinction between two contexts 
of consideration, which are the context w of a working sensor and the 
context b of a broken sensor. Hence we define the context space (C, 
F(C),Pc), where c~f{w,b} and the valuation measure Pc: F(C) 
~,  Pc({W})D-f0.8, Pc({b})D-f0.2 (motivated by R 1) are given. 
For reasons of abbreviation we introduce the following characteristics 
on 1~: 
ON ~f{on} × DOM(SENSOR) × DOM(ALARM), 
DOWN ~Y 1~ \ ON 
WORKING DfDOM(SYSTEM) × {working} × DOM(ALARM), 
BROKEN ~f 1~ \ WORKING 
RINGING ~fDOM(SYSTEM) × DOM(SENSOR) × {ringing}, 
QUIET ~f 1~ \ RINGING. 
Suppose ~o t ~ 1) to be the unknown original state of our object at time 
t. From this we specify our vague observation of {oJ t} by a vague character- 
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istic ~/~ Fc(12). A priori we know that y(w) = WORKING and y(b) = 
BROKEN. 
R 2 induces the specification of a context-independent and time- 
independent observation of w t, that is R D_ff~ \ {(on, working, ringing), 
(down, working, quiet)}. 
Further context-independent vidence is available at time t, since we 
have the additional information that the alarm bell is ringing. This evi- 
dence is formalized by the characteristic E ~f RINGING. 
R and E are assumed to be correct for Origv, i.e. {w t} = Origr ___ R n E. 
The fuzzifications of R and E w.r.t. C, designated by extc(R) and extc(E), 
respectively, induce a data revision of y. 
Using ~/~ev D=l(]/extc[R])extc[E] we obtain: 
%e~(w) = y(w) n (extc[R])(w) n (eXtc[E])(w) 
= {(down, working, ringing)}, 
3%v(b) = {(on, broken, ringing), (down, broken, ringing)}; 
m~o: F(9.) --, R] ,  
I 0.8, 
m~ro(A) = ~0.2, 
~0, 
ACC (DOWN) = 0.8; 
- - , ' ) ' rev  
ACCv,ov(DOWN) = 1; 
iff A = yrCv(W) 
iff A = yre~(b) 
otherwise; 
ACC o(0N) =0;  
AfCvrev(ON) = 0.2; 
I DOWN n 3,rev(C)l 
bet ~r~v(DOVV'N ) = ~] Pc({C})" 
c~C: I%ev(C)l 
Yrev(c) n DOWN ¢ O 
= 0.9; 
betvrev(ON) = 0.1. 
Obviously there is a high degree of belief (0.9) that the system is down if 
the alarm bell is ringing. 
It has to be emphasized that the DSSM approach is based on a 
restricted set of contexts. So we have to decide whether the neglection of 
inaccessible, but probably important valuation dependencies is acceptable 
or not. 
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In our example it seems to be questionable to content ourselves with 
the two chosen contexts of consideration (sensor working/broken), aswe 
expect an influence of the system's reliability (on/down) to a justified 
decision on the system's state at time t. 
7.2. Solution by Application of Bayes Theory 
The final remark of the previous section indicates that the vague 
characteristic y ~ Fc(fD may be viewed as a context coarsening of another 
vague characteristic y* E Fc,(fl) , arranged by a context reduction mapping 
~: C* ~ C. 
In fact the starting point of a pure probabilistic (Bayesian) approach to 
the unreliable alarm paradigm is the definition of a refined context set C*, 
where each element corresponds to one possible world of consideration, 
that is an elementary characteristic of our frame of discernment. 
Therefore we define c*~fl), y*: C*~ F(I)), given by (Vc*~ C*) 
(y*(c*) °--f{c*}), and ~: C* ~ C, 
p(c*) o__f ( w, iff c* ~ WORKING 
b, iff c* ~ BROKEN. 
Obviously we have Coars%(y*)--T, which means that the DSSM- 
related vague characteristic y is a context coarsening of the Bayesian- 
related vague characteristic y*. 
It credits the Bayesian approach to choose a context set that coincides 
with all possible dependencies between the attribute values of the consid- 
ered object, even if the available information on the actual state of that 
object does not support a unique valuation of the mentioned ependen- 
cies. As one consequence there is no need for context refinements if new 
valuation information occurs. 
On the other hand, the Bayesian approach as to handle the problem 
that incomplete valuation information lacks in finding a unique measure 
ec.: r(c*) 
Referred to the unreliable alarm paradigm we get the following valua- 
tion information: 
RI: Pc,(WORKING) = 0.8; Pc,(BROKEN) = 0.2; 
Rz: Pc,(QUIET[WORKING A ON) = 1, 
Pc,(RINGINGIWORKING • DOWN) = 1; 
R3: Pc,(DOWN A WORKING) = Pc,(DOWN). Pc,(WORKING). 
Let or I DfPc,(DOWN) and 7r: ~¢Pc,(RINGINGIBROKEN). Then 
we obtain the parametric probability distribution P[~rl, ~'2] Df 
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{(C*, Pc,[~l, "/r2]({C*})lC* E C*}, 
undermentioned tabular: 






RINGING QUIET RINGING QUIET 
0 0.8(1 - ~r 1) 




0.2%(1 - 7r 2) 
The probabilities % and 7r 2 are not available, i.e., all we know 
is "/rl, 77" 2 E [0, 1]. AS  careful probabilists we consider the family 
D~---f{P["B'I, 7rZ]l"W1, 77" 2 ~ [0, 1]} o f  probability d is t r ibut ions .  
Since 
0.8 + 0.27r 2 
Pc,(DOWNIRINGING) = %"  0.87.1.1 --~ 0.277- 2 ' 
0, 
iff % • 7r 2 > 0 
otherwise, 
we get 
inf {Pc,(DOWNIRINGING)} = 0, 
7rl, ~2 ~ [0, 1] 
sup {Pc,(DOWNIRINGING)} = 1. 
7rl, ~r2~ [0, 1] 
In spite of the information that the alarm bell is ringing, we remain in 
total ignorance about the system's tate at time t. So we have no choice 
but adding further restrictive assumptions to come to a decision within the 
Bayesian approach. 
The typical aid to solve this problem is the application of the insufficient 
reason principle. 
of 
Let Yrev = ('YeXtc[Rl)extc[El" According to the symbolics used in the previ- 
ous section we find the following results: 
, , {{c*} ,  i f f c*  ~R f3E  
%ev(C )= Q~, otherwise 
rn~,o : F (~)  ~ R~, 
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0.2(1 - 77"1)"rg2, 
/ 0.2rqrr 2 , 
~ 0.8'77"1 ,
m~,a(A) = [ 0"8(1 _ rq) 
] +0.2(1  - "n'2), 
I0,  
iff A = {(on, broken, ringing)} 
iff A = {(down, broken, ringing)} 
iff A = {(down, working, ringing)} 
i f fA  =O 
otherwise 
ACC~.v(DOWN) = Pc.({c* ~ C*I(~ -~ y*v(C*) _ DOWN}) 
= 0.2~rlrr z + 0.871" 1 = 7./-1(0. 8 q- 0.27r2) 
ACCvr*o,,(DOWN) = PC,({C* ~ C*l'Yr~v(C*) n DOWN 4= Q}) 
----- rrl(0.8 + 0.2,'n" 2) 
Acc~%(ON)  = ACC~*ov(ON) = 0.2(1 - %)~'2 
betrTov(DOWN) = ~r1(0.8 + 0.2#2)/ (1  - m~; (O)) 
betr~ (ON) = 0.2(1 - 7rl)Tr2/(1 - mrto (~3)) 
Note that in the context model there is no justification for the normal- 
ization of valuations, but the conformity of results with the traditional 
Bayesian approach is illustrated by 
Pc.(DOWNIRING) = betr%(DOWN). 
By application of the insufficient reason principle (Tr 2 °--f0.5)we obtain: 
bet,,or(DOWN) = 0.9#1/(1 - m~%(O)), 
betv%(ON) = 0.1(1 - ,B '1 ) / (1  - m~,ov(O) ).
In opposite to the DSSM the Bayesian approach shows that there is 
a strict dependency of bet~.v(DOWN) and betv.ov(ON) from the general 
reliability of the system (quantified by 7rl). 
If we have, for example, a system of high reliability (% D=f0.01), then 
betv%(DOWN) = 0.0833, betr.o(ON) = 0.9167, and the decision "system is 
on at time t" has to be preferred. On the other hand, if 7r a of 0.99, then 
betv. (DOWN) = 0.9989, betv. (ON) = 0.0011, and "system is down at time 
t" is the favorite decision. So the Bayesian approach gives us a hint that we 
need a quantification of the system's reliability if we want to get a well 
founded decision. 
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7.3. Short Comparison: Dempster-Shafer-Smets Model vs. Bayes Theory 
The main advantage of the DSSM becomes apparent in its information- 
related selection of contexts; there is no refinement of contexts, whenever 
it is not necessary because of a lack of valuating information. 
On the other hand, the simplification of consideration by context coars- 
ening has to be justified ependent from the given decision problem, which 
turns out to be a difficult task in many cases. Since several defenders of 
the DSSM unfortunately tend to omit the mentioned justification, they 
often calculate misleading results that factually hide existing decision- 
making problems. A careful selection of contexts could avoid much of the 
criticism on the Dempster-Shafer-Smets model. 
The Bayesian approach enforces the full structuring of possible depen- 
dencies between all attributes of the object under consideration. Therefore 
it supports a better foundation of the decision-making process, since 
there is no hidden coarsening of contexts. As a consequence all additional 
assumptions that extend the disposable information--like, for example, 
the insufficient reason principle--have to be explicitly defined. The disad- 
vantage of the Bayesian approach lies in the necessity of exhaustively 
structured contexts, even if only incomplete valuation information is given. 
Within the context model the formal differences of the two considered 
models are the following: 
The Bayesian approach deals with a family ~ = {(C, F(C), Pc[t])[t ~ T} 
of context spaces with a fixed set C of contexts and parameterized 
probability measures Pc[t], t ~ T. 
Additional valuating information i duces a restriction of T and therefore 
the transition to a subset of ~.  
The DSSM operates on a single context space (C, F(C), Pc), which has 
to be refined in the light of new valuating information. Hence the underly- 
ing set of contexts is not expected to be fixed. 
Nevertheless it should be pointed out that there are also strong connec- 
tions of the two approaches within the context model: Both approaches 
make use of vague characteristics to specify vague observations of elemen- 
tary characteristics. Furthermore they apply the same selected types of 
operations on vague characteristics (e.g., specialization (conditioning, data 
revision), combination, refinement, coarsening) and after all the same 
decision making process by the bet-function-concept of the context model. 
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we have introduced the concept of valuated vague charac- 
teristics and the context model as an integrating model of vagueness and 
uncertainty. The motivation for the context model arises from the inten- 
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tion to develop a common formal environment that supports a better 
understanding and comparison of existing models of partial ignorance to 
reduce the rivalry between well-known approaches. 
Related to a given decision problem the typical structuring used in 
Bayes theory has turned out to be conform to context-precise valuated 
characteristics due to sets of exhaustively separated contexts, whereas the 
typical Dempster-Shafer-Smets structuring tends to coincide with the 
application of vague characteristics with respect to simplified consideration 
contexts. This coarsening seems to be helpful for many decision problems 
of practical interest, but on the other hand it is of course quite dangerous, 
whenever the choice of consideration contexts is doubtful. 
The relationships between the Context Model and Possibility Theory as 
developed by Dubois and Prade [14] is established by operations on 
so-called possibility functions induced by information compression map- 
pings [Ic, D: Fc(D) ~ Poss(D), I-Ic, D(T) DZ,n.[T] ' where Poss(D) Df{TrlTr: 
D ---, ~ A ]~'(D)I ~ t~} and 7r[y]: D ~ ~;  7r[y](d)Dfpc({C ~ Cld 
y(c)}), for all vague characteristics 3'~ Fc(D) that are valuated w.r.t. 
(C, F(C), Pc). 
Possibility functions have formal relationships to possibility distribu- 
tions, fuzzy sets, plausibility functions for singletons, and one-point cover- 
ages of random sets, but there are differences because of the semantics of 
the underlying valuated vague characteristics. 
The consideration of correctness- and contradiction-preserving map- 
pings, incorporating the additional concept of sufficiency-preservation, 
offers interesting results regarding the context model's justification of 
Zadeh's extension principle [29], the principle of minimum specificity [30], 
and the relevance of the G6del relation for approximate reasoning with 
respect o conjunctive systems of inference rules [31]. The corresponding 
new approach to possibility theory and fuzzy set theory by the context 
model is topic of separate papers [32, 33]. 
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